In this paper, we study the newsvendor game with supply uncertainty, where multiple retailers form a coalition to cooperate to place orders to minimize the cost and share risk facing uncertain supplies and demands. After the orders are delivered and the demands are realized, the actual arrival quantities are allocated among the retailers to minimize the total cost. We compute the cost functions by using two-stage stochastic programming model and show that the cooperative game has a nonempty core. Also we propose a method to calculate an allocation in the core.
Introduction
With the globalization of economics and business, supply uncertainty has become more and more important for a company, and brought great challenge to supply chain management. Factors such as the capacity of suppliers, the quality of products, the variation of lead-time and man-made or natural disasters may make our decisions more complicated than ever [1] [2] [3] [4] . Therefore, Supply uncertainty is one of the most important issues in supply chain risk management [5] . In order to reduce the risk brought by supply uncertainty, many mitigation policies have been adopted by firms and analyzed theoretically, e.g., dual sourcing or multi-sourcing and supplier diversification [1] and [6] , coordinating to sharing the risk between upstream and downstream firms [6] , cooperating to improve supply reliability [7] . [1] pointed out that an interesting direction for future research is to analyze cooperative decision-making in the presence of supply risk, e.g., a group of buyers cooperate to make purchases, which would then lead to question about how they should allocate the supply risk among themselves.
In practice, many retailers which sell the same products often cooperate horizontally to manage supply and demand uncertainty, especially for small or medium firms. That is, a set of retailers form a coalition to cooperate to place orders facing uncertain demands and supplies. After the orders are delivered and the demands are realized, someone find that they have excess inventories and others find that their demands can't be satisfied. The ones with excess inventory will give inventories to the ones with unsatisfied demands. This phenomenon is called as warming themselves by huddling. In this situation, there are some problems need to be answered: Whether is the coalition stable? How to allocate their costs? Is it difficult to get the allocation mechanism? We adopt the notion of core in cooperative game theory to study the problem.
There are two steams of literature related to this study.
unsatisfied demands. Transshipments incur costs. We show that the core is nonempty and propose a method to compute an allocation in the core. Our study is related to [40] . But there are some essential differences between Chen and Zhang' model and ours. First, they assume that all the suppliers are reliable while we assume that the suppliers are uncertain. Second, they assume that the retailers place a joint order to the same supplier. The order is delivered to a central warehouse first and then is allocated to the retailers after the demands are realized. We assume that the retailers place their orders to their suppliers respectively and the orders are delivered to the retailers' warehouses. Transshipments occur between the retailers when some have excess inventories and others' demands can't be satisfied. In addition, transshipments will incur costs.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present newsvendor game with supply uncertainty. In Section 3 we study the computation of payoff functions. In Section 4 we show that the game has a nonempty core and propose an allocation in the core. Some conclusions are given in Section 5.
Notation and Model
In this section we state the notation used in this paper and the model. Consider a set of n retailers, which sell the same products. Let   For a coalition S , it is easy to see that the characteristic function   CS is the optimal value of the following two-stage stochastic linear program:
. . 0 , to minimize the total cost for the coalition, which includes inventory holding cost, penalty cost and transshipment costs after the demands are realized. The first and the second constraints in (2) are inventorydemand balance constraints. The third constraint in (2) means that retailer i cannot transship more to others than he receives. The fourth constraint in (2) 
The Case that the Supply Uncertainty and Demands are Given
In this subsection, we consider the case that supply uncertainties and random demands are given. Since the order decision 
The strong duality is applied since problems (3) and (4) 
The Case with Supply Uncertainties and Random Demands
In this subsection, we discuss the case that retailers face supply uncertainties and random demands.
For the stochastic programming problem (1)- (2), the dual is 
, 
Proof. For any supply uncertainty vector
, we can get that for any feasible 
Therefore, from Theorem 1 in [40] , we know that () CS is equal to the optimal value of problem (6), for any collection of retailers SN  . [40] showed the strong duality for the inventory centralization games with reliable suppliers. We generalize their results to the newsvendor game with supply uncertain.
It is intuitive to understand the relationship between the original problem (1)-(2) and the dual problem (6) . There are two selectable approaches to satisfy demands. In the first approach, retailers cooperate to make order and allocate product among them to minimize the expected total cost for the coalition. This is exactly problem (1)- (2) . In the second approach, the retailers outsource the ordering and allocation to another company, and pay a charge depending on the realization of supply uncertainty and random demand to the company. The company maximizes the total charge. The charge includes purchase cost, freight cost, inventory holding cost, and penalty cost. This is exactly problem (6) . Theorem 1 shows that the costs of these two approaches are the same. defined by (9) is an allocation in the core of the newsvendor game with supply uncertainty.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we know that ()
CS is equal to the optimum of problem (6) for
is an optimal solution of problem (6) with SN  , then we have
is an allocation of the game.
On the other hand, since
is an optimal solution of the dual problem is in the core of the game. [40] studied the newsvendor game with reliable supplier, and show that one retailer's cost allocation has nothing with other retailers. Here we consider the newsvendor games with unreliable suppliers. The cost allocation one retailer's cost depends on not only himself but also all the other retailers' supply uncertainties. From Theorem 2, we can get Corollary 1. 
Conclusion
We analyze the newsvendor game with supply uncertainty, where multiple retailers form a coalition to cooperate to share risk facing uncertain supplies and demands. We formulate a two-stage stochastic programming model to compute the cost functions of each coalition. By using dual method, we show that newsvendor game with supply uncertainty has a nonempty core and propose a way to find a cost allocation in the core.
Based on our study, there are some topics need to be studied further: (1) newsvendor game with price-dependent demand and supply uncertainty. (2) inventory game with supply uncertainty in multiple periods.
